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I. INTRODUCTION
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that
the case was not ripe because the plaintiff landowner had not received a "final
decision" from the state.2 Secondly, the court held that the unfilled wetlands
portion of plaintiffs land had "value" of $157,000 as an open space "gift."3
Therefore, there was no deprivation of all economically beneficial use as
required to meet the categorical total taking rule in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council Third, the Court held that the plaintiff acquired the property
with notice that it might be undevelopable, and consequently could not bring
a takings claim.5 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court had before it the issues of
ripeness, denominator, whether value is relevant in determining that there is
no economically beneficial use left in the property, and the relevance of
purchasor notice in total takings cases and determining distinct or reasonable
investment-backed expectations in partial takings cases. This symposium
discusses how the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with those issues.
The law of takings is divided into two principal parts: physical and
regulatory. In the first category is that which we call eminent domain or
compulsory purchase. With one exception (inverse condemnation), physical
* The original version of this paper was first presented at a Rocky Mountain Land Use
Institute program in April, 2001, and appears here as modified with the gracious permission of
the Institute.
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746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000). For a detailed summary of the facts and holdings in this case,
see David L Callies & Calvert G. Chipchase, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island: Ripeness and 'Notice'
Rule Clarified and Statutory 'Background Principles' Narrowed, 33 URB. LAW. 907 (2001).
2 Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 713-14.
3 See id. at715.
4 See id. at 713-14 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015
(1992)).
5 See id. at 714-17.
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taking occurs when government intends to take land or an interest in land. A
regulatory taking occurs when government, through the exercise of the police
or regulatory power, so burdens land, or an interest in land, with land use
regulations that courts treat the action as if government had intended
physically to exercise eminent domain. United States Supreme Court cases
govern most aspects of takings on the theory that either the Fifth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution (nor shall private property be taken for public use
without the payment of just compensation) or the Fourteenth Amendment (nor
shall private property be taken without due process of law) applies to physical
and regulatory takings. What follows is a general description and analysis of
the types of takings, together with recent trends in each.
II. PHYSICAL TAKINGS: THE EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN, OR THE
POWER TO CONDEMN
The power to take land, or an interest in land, is generally regarded as an
inherent power of the state and federal governments as sovereign entities, and
a delegated power (usually through enabling legislation) to local governments
and public utilities. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is a
limitation on that general power to take land, requiring that (1) the taking be
for a public use or purpose (one and the same in most jurisdictions); and (2)
the landowner receive just compensation for land taken by the government.
Most state constitutions have similar limitations on physical takings by
government.
A. The Taking Must Be for a Public Purpose
The U.S. Supreme Court has, for the most part, eliminated the public use
limitation on physical takings by declaring that virtually any legislative
declaration that is "conceivable" and not an "impossibility" will support such
a taking, even if the purpose turns out later to be unachievable or impossible.'
Most states subscribe to the same theory-although some, like Michigan,
judicially scrutinize declarations of public purpose with a more jaundiced eye.7
There is increasing public concern of late that government has run amuck in
taking property for barely conceivable public purposes, such as casinos,
automobile plants, and even a football franchise.8 So far, however, successful
6 Hawai'i Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); see also Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954).
" See, e.g., City of Lansing v. Edward Rose Realty, 502 N.W.2d 638 (Mich. 1993).
8 See Eminent Thievery, WAdLST. J., Jan. 17,2001, at A26; For the Greater Good, PLAN.,
Oct. 20, 2000, at 10-13.
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challenges to physical takings claims based on lack of public use or purpose
grounds have been few and far between.9
B. The Landowner Must Receive Just Compensation
Absent rare exercise of emergency powers, virtually any physical
interference with private land requires compensation to the landowner. The
principal case on the subject is Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter CATV
Corp., ° in which the U.S. Supreme Court required that the owner of an
apartment building be compensated for a small cable box and wires
compulsorily attached to her building pursuant to a local ordinance. The
majority of the Court turned aside the arguments of the minority that de
minimis invasions of property could be uncompensated. What constitutes just
compensation is well beyond the scope of this introduction. It involves the use
of various forms of valuing property and interests in property that is usually
the prerogative of expert appraisers, generally Members of the Appraisers
Institute ("MAI").
II. REGULATORY TAKINGS
Simply stated, if a land use regulation (zoning, subdivision, and so forth)
goes "too far" in reducing the use of a parcel of land, then it is a taking
requiring compensation, as if the government physically took or condemned
an interest in (or all of) the land. The U.S. Supreme Court established this
basic principle in the 1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon." The
question then becomes, of course, what is "too far"? In Pennsylvania Coal,
the Court made it abundantly clear that the decision was not an attack on all
land use controls. Indeed, just a year later, the same Court upheld local zoning
regulations against a Fourteenth Amendment challenge (taking of property
without due process of law).' 2 Many times over the past dozen years, the
Court has reiterated its understanding that state and local government may
regulate the use of land under the police power, for the health, safety, and
welfare of the people, without violating constitutional proscriptions against the
taking of property without compensation.' 3 At the same time, however, the
Court has laid down guidelines for when a regulation takes property. These
' See, e.g., 99 Cents Only Store v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, CV 00-07572 SVW
(AJWx), 2001 WL 811056 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2001) (holding that condemning a viable store
to allow the expansion of another was not a taking of property for a public use).
10 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
" 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
12 See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
13 See, e.g., id.
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fall into two categories: total or per se takings, and partial takings. 4
However, either category of cases must first be "ripe."
A. Ripeness
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,"5
the Court erected its infamous "ripeness" barrier to applied, as compared to
facial, regulatory takings lawsuits. Its two-part requirement-(1) a final
decision under government regulatory laws; and (2) a seeking of just
compensation under the state's eminent domain procedures-makes it very
difficult for landowners to bring takings challenges. 6 The Court in Palazzolo
emphasized the "futility" defense to the ripeness barrier: a landowner is not
required to futilely seek endless 'imal decisions" when the factual
circumstances demonstrate that no development of any kind will be permitted
on the subject property. Here, because fill would be required for any
economically beneficial use of Palazzolo's land and no fill permit was
available from the state, the takings claim was ripe. Professor Roberts
analyzes the Williamson requirement and the futility exception in his article.
"4 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
473 U.S. 172 (1985).
16 See id. at 186. For critical commentaries on Hamilton Bank, see Michael M. Berger,
Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New GroundRulesfor Land-Use-
Planning, 20 URB. LAw. 735 (1988); Michael M. Berger, "Ripeness" Testfor Land Use Cases
Needs Reform: Reconciling Leading Ninth Circuit Decisions is an Exercise in Futility, 11
ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 57 (1988); Michael M. Berger, The Civil Rights Act: An Alternative
Remedy for Property Owners Which Avoids Some of the Procedural Traps and Pitfalls in
Traditional "Takings" Litigation, 12 ZONING & PLAN. L REP. 121 (1989); Michael M. Berger,
The "Ripeness" Mess in Federal Land Use Cases or How the Supreme Court Converted
Federal Judges into Fruit Peddlers, 1991 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN § 7;
Brian W. Blaesser, Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Owners: The Ripeness
and Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 73 (1988);
Douglas W. Kmiec, Disentangling Substantive Due Process and Taking Claims, 13 ZONING &
PLAN. L. REP. 57 (1990); R. Jeffrey Lyman, Finality Ripeness in Federal Land Use Cases from
Hamilton Bank to Lucas, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL L. 101 (1993); Daniel R. Mandelker &
Michael M. Berger, A Plea to Allow the Federal Courts to Clarify the Law of Regulatory
Takings, LAND USE L & ZONING DiG., Jan. 1990, at 3; Daniel R. Mandelker & Brian W.
Blaesser, Applying the Ripeness Doctrine in Federal Land Use Litigation, 11 ZONING & PLAN.
L REP. 49 (1988); Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A Survey
of Decisions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating Land Use
Cases, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL L 91 (1994); Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness and Forum
Selection in Fifth Amendment Takings Litigation, II J. LAND USE & ENVTL L. 37 (1995);
Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV.
1(1995).
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B. Total Takings
A land use regulation totally "takes" property when it leaves the owner
without any "economically beneficial use" of the land. The land may still have
value. It may even retain sbme limited uses. It makes no difference what the
landowner knew or should have known about the regulatory climate when the
landowner acquired the land. If it has no beneficial economic use, then
government must pay for the land or rescind the regulation (and possibly pay
compensation for the time during which the illegal regulation affected the
relevant land), unless, however, the regulation falls within two exceptions:
nuisance, or background principles of a state's law of property. All these rules
come from the U.S. Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council,7 confirmed and explained in Palazzolo v. Rhode
island,'" together with some gloss added by recent decisions of the U.S.
Federal Circuit. It is worth examining the elements of total takings in a bit
more detail, to fully understand the reach of what the Court calls this
categorical or per se rule.
1. Taking of all economically beneficial use
The Lucas case presented the Court with an ideal vehicle in which to set out
criteria for deciding both total and partial takings cases. It did so in the first
category--total takings-in the opinion itself. It did so in the latter category
in footnotes, described further below. With only two exceptions (discussed
below), a regulation "takes" property when the landowner is left with no
economically beneficial use of the land.' 9
Ultimately, that is what happened to David Lucas. ° After developing a
waterfront residential project, Lucas purchased the remaining two lots on his
own account, intending to build upscale single-family residences on them."
However, before he could commence construction, the South Carolina Coastal
Council moved the beach line (seaward of which construction was prohibited)
so that Lucas's lots were now in a construction-free zone.22 The original line,
the new line, and the coastal protection statute by which authority the Council
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
533 U.S. 606 (2001).
19 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. For collective comment on Dolan and Lucas, see TAKINGS:
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFrER DOLA AND LucAs
(David L. Callies ed., 1996), and ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE (1999).
20 See generally DAVID LUCAS, LUCAS VS. THE GREEN MAcHINE (1995) (providing the
historical narrative of this landmark case).
21 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-08.
2 See id. at 1007-09.
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acted were designed to further a host of health, safety, but primarily welfare
purposes largely unique to coastal areas.' Figuring predominately in the list
of public purposes was the protection of habitat (plant, animal, and marine
species), dunes, natural environment, and the tourist industry.'
Lucas claimed that the moving of the line, together with the development
restrictions imposed by the statute and its regulations, took his property
without compensation by denying him a permit to construct anything but
walkways, and permitting no uses but camping and walking on the two lots.25
The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the statute largely on the grounds
of the paramount governmental purposes set out in the Beachfront
Management Act, and Lucas appealed.?
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.27 The Court announced that a regulation
that removes all productive or economically beneficial use from a parcel of
land is a taking requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment.' Note
that the Court writes of use and not value. Clearly, two beachfront lots have
value even if a regulation prevents all economic use. "Salvage" uses like
camping and picnicking do not count as "economically beneficial," like
building a house. It is a taking regardless of how or when the property was
acquired, regardless of the "expectations" of, or notice to, the landowner, and
regardless of the public purpose or state interest which generated the
regulation. For too long, according to the Court, police power regulations
have primarily conferred "public benefits." '29 For this the public must pay,
rather than the landowner upon whom the burden of such regulation falls:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically
beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed
use interests were not part of his title to begin with."
23 See id.
24 See id. at 1010.
25 See id. at 1007-10.
26 See id. at 1009-10.
27 See id. at 1004.
2S See id. at 1016-19. Note that this is not the same as rendering the lots or parcels
valueless, as some commentators would have it. See, e.g., MELTZ, supra note 19, at 140, 218.
29 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024.
30 Id. at 1027. For a historical argument that most private use of wetlands is not part of such
title, see Fred P. Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common Law, 15
STAN. ENvT. L.J. 247 (1996).
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2. Exceptions to the per se or categorical rule
Herein lie the Lucas exceptions to the per se rule of total takings: the Court
requires compensation for taking of all economically beneficial use unless
there can be identified "background principles of nuisance and property law
that prohibit the uses [the landowner] now intends in the circumstances in
which the property is presently found."'" Such "background principles" are
the subject of Jim Burling's article on the pages that follow. But briefly:
(a) If the common law of the state would allow neighbors or the state to
prohibit the two houses that Lucas wants to construct because they are either
public or private nuisances, then the state can prohibit them under the coastal-
zone law without providing compensation. This result occurs because such
nuisance uses are always unlawful and are never part of a landowner's title, so
prohibiting them by statute would not take away any property rights. The
Court gives as an example a law that might prohibit a landowner from filling
his land to flood his neighbor's land. 2
(b) If the background principles of the state's property law would permit
such prohibition of use as the two houses Lucas proposed to construct, then
again no compensation is required. However, the Court did not fully describe
these principles, nor did it discuss them except in a nuisance context. Custom
and public trust are increasingly relevant to the background principles
inquiry,33 as discussed by Jim Burling and Steve Eagle in their articles.
In determining whether the proposed use is a public or private nuisance and
therefore forbidden without payment of compensation, the following three
factors are critical, but only within the nuisance context: (1) the degree of harm
to public lands and resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the
claimant's proposed activities; (2) the social value of the claimant's activities
and their suitability to the locality in question; and (3) the relative ease with
which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the
claimant and the government (or adjacent private landowners).'
3' Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031. For the argument that only nuisance is a background principle
exception, see MELTZ, supra note 19, at 377. For extended commentary on the Lucas
exceptions, see Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the Takings Muddle, 28
IND. L. REv. 329 (1995); Todd D. Brody, Comment, Examining the Nuisance Exception to the
Takings Clause: Is There Lifefor Environmental Regulations After Lucas ?, 4 FORDHAM ENVTL
L. REP. 287 (1993).
32 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
33 David L. Callies, Custom and Public Trust: Background Principles of State Property
Law?, 30 ENVTL L. REP. 10,003 (2000); David L Callies & J. David Breemer, Background
Principles, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002).
14 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31 (citations omitted).
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3. Notice
The Lucas court made it clear that when a property owner learned of a land
use regulation's effect on the subject property was irrelevant to a total
regulatory takings challenge, just as it would be irrelevant in an eminent
domain proceeding. While the Rhode Island Supreme Court attempted to
engraft such a notice requirement on total takings jurisprudence, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Palazzolo firmly rejected that attempt, as discussed by
Professor Eagle and Jim Burling in their articles. However, at least one
member of the Court's majority-Justice O'Connor-finds notice important
in analyzing a landowner's investment-backed expectations under a Penn
Central partial takings analysis, while another member-Justice Scalia-finds
notice irrelevant to that analysis, as well as to the total takings analysis.
C. Partial Takings
A partial taking occurs whenever a land use regulation deprives a landowner
of sufficient use and value that goes beyond necessary exercise of the police
power for the health, safety, and welfare of the people, but stops short of
depriving the landowner of all economically beneficial use. Indeed, the
Palazzolo Court ultimately decided that Palazzolo suffered only a partial
taking, as discussed in Robert Freilich's article. Partial takings by regulation
are far more common than total takings, and the standard is not so easy to
apply.
1. The rule: distinct investment-backed expectations of the landowner
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,35 the Court set out
rules for partial takings. The Court upheld New York City's Landmarks
Preservation Law, which effectively prohibited Penn Central from constructing
a fifty-five story office building in the air rights above Grand Central Station,
a designated landmark under the law.' Penn Central claimed both the
designation and the prohibition constituted a facial and applied taking of its
property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.37 The Court held that
"landmarking" itself was broadly constitutional, and that the individual
application of the law to Grand Central Station left sufficient remaining use of
the property so as to be neither a total nor a partial taking.3
Is 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
3 See id. at 115-16, 138.
17 See id at 128-29.
3S See id. at 128-38.
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Before reaching the merits of the case, however, the Court discussed in
some detail the standards that applied in partial takings cases. The Court
suggested "several factors" that have "particular significance" when it engages
in "these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."39 The factors are:
1. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations (later also called
the "reasonable expectations of the claimant").
2. So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A "taking" may
more readily be found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference
arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good.'4
A number of cases pick up this theme of "investment-backed expectations,"
including the Lucas decision discussed infra, although the Court discussed it
largely in footnotes. While the notes are often devoted to answering the
blistering barrage directed at the Lucas Court by the dissent (the dissent's
opening salvo is: "Today the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse"'), they
evince a clear intention to allow compensation for taking of less than all
economic use, if and when such a taking is before the Court. At footnote 8,
the Lucas Court responds to a criticism by the dissent that compensation for
regulatory taking of all economic use is inconsistent with lack of compensation
for a regulatory taking of, for example, ninety percent of economic use:
This analysis errs in its assumption that the landowner whose deprivation is one
step short of complete is not entitled to compensation. Such an owner might not
be able to claim the benefit of our categorical formulation, but, as we have
acknowledged time and again, "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and... the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations" are keenly relevant to takings analysis
generally. 2
This "frustration of investment-backed expectations" standard, which the
Court chose not to apply in Lucas because it characterized the regulatory
taking as total, is clearly not rejected. Indeed, one concurring member of the
Court (Justice Kennedy) would have applied it.'3 Moreover, in an earlier
footnote, the Court had already alluded to the utility of the "reasonable
'9 See id at 123-28.
0 Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
41 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 1019 n.8 (alteration in original) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
43 See id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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expectations standard," though in a slightly different context-that of deciding
how thin to slice property interests (or, alternatively, how many sticks in the
Holfeldian bundle) for purposes of deciding whether property has been taken:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically feasible
use" rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the
"property interest" against which the loss of value is to be measured. When, for
example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its
natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in which
the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened
portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution
in value of the tract as a whole. [The note then criticizes that portion of the New
York state court's decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York, which suggested nearby property of the owner could be amalgamated with
that portion he claimed was unusual in deciding whether a taking by regulation
had occurred.] ... The answer to this difficult question may lie in how the
owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property
- i.e., whether and to what degree the State's law has accorded legal recognition
and protection to the particular interest in land with respect to which the takings
claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value."
2. Investment-backed expectations are limited to partial takings
It is critical at this stage to observe that the investment-backed expectations
rule of the Penn Central case has no applicability to the Lucas per se rule.
You will search in vain for any such implication. Indeed, the Federal Circuit
so held in late 2000: 5
In sum, we conclude that, in accord with Lucas, and not inconsistent with any
prior holding of this court, when a regulatory taking, properly determined to be
"categorical," is found to have occurred, the property owner is entitled to a
recovery without regard to consideration of investment-backed expectations. In
such a case, "reasonable investment-backed expectations" are not a proper part
of the analysis, just as they are not in the physical takings cases."
The Palazzolo Court discussed this issue, as noted by Professor Eagle, Bob
Frielich, and Jim Burling in their articles.
" id. at 1016 n.7 (emphasis added). For a different perspective on the "investment-backed
expectations" standards, see Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking
Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215 (1995); Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed
Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WAsH. L. REv. 91 (1995).
4S Palm Beach Isles Assoc. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
4 Palm Beach Isles, 231 F.3d at 1364; see also R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great
Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Supreme Court's Murky Doctrine of
Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory Takings Law? 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 449 (2001).
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D. The Denominator Issue
Common to both total and partial takings analyses is the redoubtable
"denominator issue." We have already seen how the Supreme Court framed
the issue in the Lucas footnotes discussed previously. The Court also notes,
but does not resolve, the critical impact of this issue (also called the "relevant
parcel" issue) in Palazzolo. As discussed in Steve Eagle's and Jim Burling's
articles, however, Palazzolo raised this issue too late in the course of litigation
for the Supreme Court to resolve. The principle issue is: What is the extent of
the landowner's property interest to be considered in deciding whether the
interest allegedly damaged is partially taken? Both Florida Rock Industries,
Inc. v. United States and Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States48 discussed
the denominator issue in the context of denials of section 404 (Clean Water
Act) dredge and fill permits by the Army Corps of Engineers.49 These courts
were willing to follow the rationale of Lucas, and consider a portion of the
plaintiff's entire property in assessing deprivation of all economically
beneficial use."0 For example, in Loveladies, out of 250 acres the court was
willing to consider only the devaluation of the 12.5 acres for which the Corps
denied a permit.5 With the difference being $2.7 million before the permit
denial and $12,500 thereafter, the trial court awarded the $2.7 million, which
the Federal Circuit affirmed.52 Similarly, in East Cape May Associates v.
State,53 the court held that the denominator of the parcel would not include
adjacent property that was subdivided and sold many years prior to the
enactment of the regulations at issue.54
Some courts, however, have reached the opposite conclusion. For example,
in Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes,55 the Eleventh Circuit cited Penn Central
in rejecting a landowner's claim to the taking of a particular property right,
rather than looking at his land as a whole, since he possessed a "full bundle. ' 56
47 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
" 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
4 See id. at 1173, 1179-82; Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1562, 1567-71.
50 See Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1179-82; Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1568-69.
51 See Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1180-81.
51 See id. at 1173-75, 1183.
5' 693 A.2d 114 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
14 See id. at 124-25. To the same effect is Palm Beach Isles Assoc. v. United States, 208
F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000), in which the Federal Circuit held that the relevant parcel for takings
analysis purposes was 50.7 acres, rather than 311 acres. Id. at 1380-81. The court later
separated out a 1.4 acre parcel in a subsequent decision of the same name. See Palm Beach
Isles Assoc. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1364-65 (2001).
" 95 F.3d 1066 (1th Cir. 1996).
56 See id. at 1074.
University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 24:441
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera57 rejected the
so called "single stick" argument in holding that the right to hunt on one's own
property could not be analyzed as a taking, separate from other property rights
and values on the same property, citing Penn Central and specifically rejecting
Florida Rock.5s In FIC Homes of Blackstone, Inc. v. Conservation
Commission of Blackstone,5" the court, also citing Penn Central, declared that
takings jurisprudence requires a consideration of the parcel as a whole rather
than by individual segments, and accordingly, appraised the effect of the
regulation on plaintiff's property based on all thirty-eight of plaintiff's lots to
hold that plaintiff was not completely deprived of all economically beneficial
use.' ° Following the same approach, the court in Karam v. State" considered
factors such as whether the parcels involved were always bought and sold as
a single unit, whether the plaintiffs bought both parcels under a single contract
and sold it as a single unit, and whether the parcels were assessed for tax
purposes as a single lot.62
This application of the "nonsegmentation" principle was followed with a
vengeance by the Supreme Court of Michigan in K & K Construction, Inc. v.
Department of Natural Resources.63 Here, plaintiffs were denied a permit to
fill a portion of their property that was designated as wetlands.6 Although
most of the wetlands were located on one parcel in particular, the property
consisted of four parcels in total.' Both the trial court and court of appeals
only considered the one parcel that was affected by the regulation, and held
that the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation since the denial of the permits
resulted in a deprivation of plaintiffs' interest in developing the property."
The supreme court, however, reversed and remanded, holding that the relevant
denominator included all four parcels located on the property.' 7 Specifically,
the court reasoned, "[in this case it is neither realistic nor fair to consider only
parcel one for purposes of the taking analysis. Parcels one, two, and four are
bound together through their contiguity, the unity of J.F.K's ownership interest
5 70 F.3d 1566 (10th Cir. 1995).
58 See id. at 1577.
59 673 N.E.2d 61 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
60 See id at 67.
61 705 A.2d 1221 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
2 See id. at 1228; see also Daddario v. Cape Cod Comm'n, 681 N.E.2d 833, 837 (Mass.
1997) (holding that "restrictions on a landowner's right to extract minerals... is not necessarily
a regulatory taking when the property as a whole retains substantial value.") (citing Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,496-97 (1987)).
63 575 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1998).
6 See id. at 534.
65 See id.
6See id.
67 See id. at 536, 540.
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in all three of these parcels, and plaintiffs' proposed comprehensive
development scheme."" That these and other cases continue to apply the
denominator theory in takings cases is probably a sufficient response to the
post-Lucas language in Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust,6 9 where the Court rejected segmentation
of property interests for takings purposes in a non-land use context,70 though
occasionally a judge will read Concrete Pipe to reject the argument that there
is a denominator issue involved in a nonphysical property rights case.7
IV. CONCLUSION
Palazzolo represents a critical addition to the jurisprudence of regulatory
takings. The case clarifies the rules on ripeness, emphasizes the notice and
background principles rules for total or per se categorical takings inherent in
Lucas, and suggests avenues of dealing with investment-backed expectations
for partial takings under Penn Central. What's left for the Court to decide is
how it will deal with the segmentation or relevant parcel issue in regulatory
takings, and (now that we know what is not a background principle exception
to the Lucas categorical or total taking rule) what does in fact constitute such
a background principle so as to permit a total regulatory taking without
compensation.
Id. at 537.
69 508 U.S. 602 (1993).
70 See id. at 643-44.
7' See, e.g., Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269,1295 n.30 (6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs,
J., dissenting). While Concrete Pipe has been cited several times for the proposition that real
property rights must be aggregated for takings analysis purposes, see, e.g., Marshall v. Bd. of
County Conim'rs, 912 F. Supp. 1456, 1472 (D. Wyo. 1996); Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v.
Leon County, 906 F. Supp. 1509, 1516 (N.D. Fla. 1995); Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v.
United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 232, 239 (1996); Stephenson v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 63, 69-70
(1995); Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 532-33 (Wis. 1996), other courts have
dismissed the case in a real property context on the ground that "lt]he Ordinance at issue here
is not federal economic legislation, and [therefore] the Concrete Pipe rationale does not apply,"
Guimont v. City of Seattle, 896 P.2d 70, 79 n.10 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). For the view that
Concrete Pipe is dispositive, see MELTZ, supra note 19, at 146-47. For various theories on
resolving the "segmentation" problem, see John A. Humbach, "Taking" the Imperial Judiciary
Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests and Judicial Revision of Legislative Judgments, 42
CATH. U. L. REV. 771 (1993); Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator
Problem, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 663 (1996); Daniel R. Mandelker, New Property Rights Under the
Taking Clause, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 9 (1997). For sharp and fundamentally philosophical
criticism of recent segmentation/partial takings opinions, see Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving:
Police Power, Public Value, and Private Right, 26 ENvrL L. 1 (1996).

